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Abstract: Several studies have aimed to address the natu-
ral inability of humankind to detect deception and accu-
rately discriminate lying from truth in the legal context. 
To date, it has been well established that telling a lie is 
a complex mental activity. During deception, many func-
tions of higher cognition are involved: the decision to 
lie,  withholding the truth, fabricating the lie, monitoring 
whether the receiver believes the lie, and, if necessary, 
adjusting the fabricated story and maintaining a consist-
ent lie. In the previous 15  years, increasing interest in 
the neuroscience of deception has resulted in new possi-
bilities to investigate and interfere with the ability to lie 
directly from the brain. Cognitive psychology, as well as 
neuroimaging and neurostimulation studies, are increas-
ing the possibility that neuroscience will be useful for 
lie detection. This paper discusses the scientific validity 
of the literature on neuroimaging and neurostimulation 
regarding lie detection to understand whether scientific 
findings in this field have a role in the forensic setting. We 
considered how lie detection technology may contribute 
to addressing the detection of deception in the courtroom 
and discussed the conditions and limits in which these 
techniques reliably distinguish whether an individual is 
lying.
Keywords: deception; lie detection; neuroimaging; 
neurostimulation.
Introduction
To date, scientific research has demonstrated that in a 
face-to-face meeting, the average individual is able to 
detect deception at a rate that is only slightly better than 
50%, which indicates that most individuals are no better 
at detecting deception than expected from pure guessing 
(Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991). These data have led courts 
to search for a technology-based method of lie detection, 
which may objectively improve the natural inability of 
humankind to detect deception.
Older methods that have relied on physiological 
and emotional arousal (i.e. polygraphs) have fallen 
short of generating effective techniques that provide a 
useful contribution within the forensic field (Grubin and 
Madsen, 2005; Vrij et al., 2010). The major limitation of 
these methods is that affective arousal is nonspecific 
to deception, which may lead to inflated rates of false 
positives. The emotions that are generated by attempts 
at deception often include fear and anxiety, which may 
be indistinguishable from the emotions of an honest 
individual who endures stressful questioning (Vrij et al., 
2010).
Legal debates concerning lie-detecting technology 
have existed since the 1920s; however, with few excep-
tions, laws prohibit the use of polygraphs and other tech-
nologies and instead rely on a judge and jury (Church, 
2012). In the previous 15  years, increasing interest from 
neuroscientists has opened new possibilities to investi-
gate and interfere with the ability to lie directly from the 
brain. The interest has precisely focused on the investiga-
tion of the neural correlates that enable the brain to effec-
tively produce a lie, the specific structures and cognitive 
functions involved, and how it may be possible to interfere 
with them.
From a cognitive perspective, deception is cognitively 
more demanding than truth telling (Spence et al., 2004). 
A lie involves one or more of the following mental opera-
tions: the decision to lie, withholding the truth, fabricat-
ing the lie, monitoring whether the receiver believes the 
lie, and, if necessary, adjusting the fabricated story and 
maintaining a consistent lie. These mental operations 
make lying a cognitively demanding task.
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This paper focuses on the literature regarding neuro-
imaging and neurostimulation studies to understand 
whether scientific findings in this field may have a crucial 
role in the detection of deception in the forensic setting. 
Furthermore, we only selected papers that referred to the 
detection of deception in adults because even if children 
exhibit an ability to make untrue statements, in contrast 
to adults, they are unable to cover up their misdeed.
We used the PubMed online database to select papers 
published from January 2001 to December 2015. Our key 
search terms were ‘Deception’ combined with ‘fMRI’ or 
‘tDCS’ or ‘TMS’. All studies selected for review were con-
ducted in humans and were written in English.
Detection of deception from brain 
scans
Since the publication of these pioneering reports, the func-
tional neuroimaging of deception has rapidly increased, 
which has led to the development of the cognitive neuro-
science of deception. Several studies have focused on the 
identification of the areas involved in lie production and 
the underlying cognitive processes, whereas other studies 
have focused on creating experimental settings more 
similar to real life.
In this section, we discussed findings regarding the 
use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to 
map the liar brain; therefore, we did not consider scien-
tific articles on malingering or studies focused on testing 
the validity of the fMRI technique or research conducted 
in the social field.
To map the liar brain
The first fMRI protocol to investigate the deceitful brain 
regarding autobiographical and episodic memory was 
created by Spence et al. (2001). They used two computer-
ized lying protocols, which included auditory and visual 
procedures, with a forced yes or no response regarding 
daily activities. The results indicated substantial activa-
tion in the bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) 
and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in combination 
with an increasing reaction time in deceptive responses.
For testing neuroimaging as a Lie Detector, Langleben 
et al. (2002) used a modified version of the Guilty Knowl-
edge task (GKT), a questioning technique that has been 
extensively utilized in the forensic field (Lykken, 1991). 
In this study, the participants were given playing cards 
and were instructed to deny the possession of the cards. 
The results demonstrated that increased activity in the 
superior frontal gyrus (SFG), ACC, premotor, motor, and 
anterior parietal cortices was associated with deception 
(Langleben et al., 2002).
In these studies focused on mapping the liar brain, the 
authors have indicated that the lie should not be summa-
rized in a single cognitive process, much less in a specific 
area of the brain; in contrast, depending on the type of lie, 
the activation of different areas may be considered. For 
example, in the study by Ganis et al. (2003), they tested the 
differences between two dimensions of lies: spontaneous 
lies and the capability to deceit according to a memorized 
scenario regarding personal work experience. They deter-
mined that both lie conditions activate the bilateral ante-
rior prefrontal cortex (PFC) and bilateral parahippocampal 
gyro, which were quiescent during the truth condition. Spe-
cifically, for the well-rehearsed lie condition, the authors 
identified substantial activation in the right anterior frontal 
cortices compared with spontaneous lies, which elicited 
activation in the ACC and posterior visual cortex. Further-
more, in the study by Nunez et al. (2005), the participants 
were instructed to respond truthfully or untruthfully to a 
series of yes/no questions regarding ‘autobiographical’ 
and ‘nonautobiographical’ content. The results indicated 
an interference effect (longer reaction times for false versus 
true responses) that was accompanied by increased activa-
tion within the anterior cingulate, caudate and thalamic 
nuclei, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which 
comprises a circuit that has been implicated in response 
conflict and cognitive control. Furthermore, a correlation 
between the reaction time and left caudate activity sup-
ported the presence of increased response inhibition when 
falsifying responses. The neural and behavioral data were 
more robust when falsifying autobiographical responses, 
and the mesial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices 
were recruited. The authors concluded that the process 
of interference is inherent to the act of falsifying informa-
tion, and the amount of conflict induced and the cognitive 
control needed to successfully execute false responses are 
greater when dealing with personal information.
To determine whether neural activity correlates with 
changes in electrodermal activity (EDA), Kozel et  al. 
(2004a) implemented a modified Control Question test 
paradigm, in which it was required to provide both truth-
ful and deceitful answers regarding the location of money. 
The results demonstrated that the orbitofrontal and ACC 
were significantly activated during deception. More-
over, the activities in these regions were correlated with 
changes in the EDA.
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To attempt to improve the consistency of the individ-
ual results, Kozel et  al. (2004b) subsequently replicated 
the previous study. During the scan, the subjects were 
required to indicate whether money was under the objects 
presented in the picture. Blood oxygen level-dependent 
fMRI significance maps were generated for subjects who 
provided a deceptive answer minus a truthful answer (lie 
minus true) and the reverse (true minus lie). Consistent 
with previous studies, the lie minus true group analysis 
indicated significant activation in the right orbitofrontal, 
inferior frontal, middle frontal cortex, cingulate gyrus, and 
left middle frontal area, whereas there was no significant 
activation for true minus lie. Unfortunately, the present 
technique lacks good predictive power for individuals.
Langleben et al. (2005) also performed a quantitative 
analysis in individual subjects. They assessed the accu-
racy of fMRI in conjunction with a Formal Forced-Choice 
paradigm (GKT) to confirm brain activation during lie 
responses in the superior medial and inferolateral PFC. 
The combination of the fMRI technique and GKT appeared 
sensitive in the detection of deception with an accuracy 
of 78%.
Three studies have focused on determining whether 
errors are differentiable from deceptive responses during 
a task. To address this topic, two studies were conducted 
(Abe et al., 2008; Bhatt et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009). Abe 
et  al. (2008) proposed an experiment to identify brain 
activity consequent to memory, false memory, and decep-
tion. They used word lists that consisted of semantic asso-
ciations that produce memory errors with an increased 
probability. The results demonstrated that prefrontal 
activity was specifically associated with the generation of 
deceptive responses, whereas the difference between true 
recognition and false recognition was identified in the left 
temporo-parietal regions likely engaged in the encoding 
of auditory presented words.
Lee et  al. (2009) used a Word List Learning Recog-
nition paradigm to determine whether brain activity 
associated with intentional faked responses is different 
compared with the activity associated with errors com-
mitted unintentionally. The findings of this event-related 
fMRI study clearly indicated that the brain activity associ-
ated with intentional faked responses was different com-
pared with the activity associated with errors committed 
unintentionally. For intentional faked responses, signifi-
cant activation was identified in the VLPFC, posterior cin-
gulate region, and precuneus. No significant activation 
was identified for unintentional errors.
Bhatt et al. (2009) investigated the neural correlates 
of intentionally misidentifying individuals (deception) 
versus truth telling using a Facial Identification task. 
For the truth condition, the participants were required to 
select previously viewed faces in a line up, whereas for 
the deception condition, they were required to select dif-
ferent figures instead of the figure they had stored. fMRI 
deception scans indicated a strong activation in the right 
middle frontal gyrus, red nucleus, inferior frontal gyrus, 
supramarginal gyrus, SFG, ACC, DLPFC, and bilateral 
precuneus. These findings provide information regarding 
facial misleading, which was mediated by prefrontal and 
parietal networks.
Interestingly, research has applied functional con-
nectivity analysis to investigate the deception network, 
an investigation that reflects statistical dependencies 
between distinct and distant regions of information pro-
cessing of neuronal populations. To examine the brain 
network of deception, researchers used a Picture Choice 
task that comprised three conditions: a ‘true’ condition 
(the participants were required to provide an honest 
response), an ‘inverse’ condition (the participants were 
required to provide an opposite response), and a ‘lie’ con-
dition (the participants were required to devise a strategy 
to deceive other individuals, with the goal of skillfully 
lying and avoiding detection). In this study, whole-brain 
functional connectivity networks from correlations among 
brain regions were used for the lie-telling and truth-telling 
conditions for each subject (Jiang et al., 2015). The results 
indicated that lie-telling could be differentiated from 
truth-telling with an accuracy of 82.81% (85.94% for lie-
telling and 79.69% for truth-telling). The connectivity of 
the fronto-parietal networks, cerebellum, and cingulo-
opercular networks is most discriminating, which thereby 
implies that these three networks are crucial in the pro-
cessing of deception (Figure 1).
Finally, to assess the possibility that fMRI may be 
subject to countermeasures employed to confuse decep-
tion detection procedures, Ganis et  al. (2011) conducted 
an fMRI study using a modified Concealed Information 
Test, in which the participants were trained to use a covert 
countermeasure while lying about knowing their birth 
date. The results indicated robust differences between 
deceptive and honest responses without countermeas-
ures, but not with countermeasures. Furthermore, in 
individual participants, the deception detection accuracy 
decreased from 100% without countermeasures to 33% 
with countermeasures.
Collectively, the current findings have demonstrated 
that the PFC plays a pivotal role in human honest behavior. 
These studies have successfully demonstrated that fMRI is 
a technique able to discriminate brain-activity patterns of 
deception and differentiate the neural activations involved 
in making unintentional errors from intentionally faking 
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responses; however, critical aspects emerge with respect 
to its utilization in forensic settings and the possibility 
of adopting countermeasures to confuse the detection of 
deception and the low reliability in individual subjects.
Detection of deception in real 
settings
Previous fMRI studies on deception have implemented 
tasks less comparable to the daily situations in which 
individuals lie. To overcome this limitation, research-
ers have attempted to adapt the experimental settings to 
improve their similarity to real conditions. For example, 
Phan et al. (2005) used a novel real-time fMRI technology 
to simulate a polygraph experience to evoke performance 
anxiety regarding the generation of lies and aimed to 
ascertain the neural correlates of deception. They used 
an adaptation form of the GKT previously described by 
Langleben et  al. (2002). Subjects reported performance 
anxiety during the task. The results confirm a specific 
activation of the VLPFC, DLPFC, dorsal medial prefrontal 
cortex, and superior temporal sulcus.
Figure 1: Deception-modulated functional connectivity.
Regions are color-coded by category. Red represents the cingulo-opercular network, green represents the fronto-parietal network, dark 
blue represents the default network, light blue represents the sensorimotor network, purple represents the occipital network, and yellow 
represents the cerebellum. Functional connectivities are also color-coded, with blue lines representing stronger connections and gray lines 
representing weaker connections. [Adapted from Jiang et al. (2015) with permission from BioMed Central Society].
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To understand the brain mechanisms related to decep-
tion and compare the results with a standard polygraph 
situation, Mohamed et  al. (2006) used a mock shooting 
scenario to elicit a similar reaction in committing a crime 
in which participants were required to deny involvement 
in a shooting. Subjects were divided into two groups: one 
group was instructed to tell the truth, whereas the other 
group was instructed to deliberately lie about having 
shot in the hospital. The results indicated that deceptive 
responses activated specific areas of the frontal lobe (left 
medial and left inferior frontal lobes), temporal lobe (right 
hippocampus and right middle temporal gyrus), occipital 
lobe (left lingual gyrus), ACC, right fusiform gyrus, and 
right sublobar insula. The polygraph examination indi-
cated 92% accuracy in deceptive subjects.
Furthermore, in a study by Kozel et al. (2009), a mock 
sabotage scenario was implemented. In the experimen-
tal setting, the Mock-crime group damaged and stole 
compact discs, which contained incriminating video 
footage, whereas the No-crime group did not perform 
a task. Both groups were instructed to report that they 
picked up an envelope; however, they did not sabotage 
video evidence. The participants were subsequently 
scanned while being asked questions regarding the mock 
crime. Moreover, the participants performed Ring-Watch 
testing, which comprised a simple laboratory-based fMRI 
deception test that consisted of ‘stealing’ a watch or ring. 
The participants were instructed to report that they did 
not steal the objects. The results indicated that deception 
was correctly identified during the Ring-Watch testing in 
25 of 36 participants (Validated Group). In this Validated 
Group for whom a determination was made, computer-
based scoring correctly identified nine of nine Mock-Crime 
participants (100% sensitivity) and five of 15  No-crime 
participants (33% specificity). The use of blood oxygen 
level-dependent fMRI to detect deception regarding previ-
ous events exhibited high sensitivity and low specificity.
To investigate the brain maintenance of deliber-
ate deception, Kireev et al. (2015) implemented positron 
emission tomography (PET) and event-related fMRI. They 
used an experimental paradigm that presupposed free 
choices between equally beneficial deceptive or honest 
actions. The experimental task simulated the ‘Cheat’ card 
game, which aims to defeat an opponent via sequential 
deceptive and honest claims. They obtained two types of 
results. The first result is connected to the action of lying 
or being honest and activated a fronto-parietal brain 
network formed by the inferior and middle frontal gyri, 
precentral gyrus, caudate nucleus, and inferior parietal 
lobule; the second result, which included a comparison 
between decision making of gains and losses, indicated 
an activation of areas specifically associated with decep-
tion execution: the precentral gyrus, caudate nuclei, thal-
amus, and inferior parietal lobule.
In these studies, the researchers have attempted to 
create experimental settings that are more similar to real 
life; however, the results do not exhibit important differ-
ences compared with previous studies.
Other correlates of deception
To provide a better marker of deception that differs from 
executive functions, Lee et al. (2013) focused on percep-
tual functions. During a Face Recognition task, partici-
pants were instructed to lie about the familiarity of a set 
of photos: the faces of individuals who were personally 
familiar to the participants and the faces of unfamiliar 
persons. The authors identified activity in the left precu-
neus during the perception of familiar faces accurately 
marked in 11 of 13 subjects who lied about not knowing 
faces that were familiar to them. These findings provide 
preliminary evidence that neural activity associated 
with perception but not executive processes may provide 
an alternative marker of deception with regard to face 
familiarity.
Other authors have measured the impact of the affec-
tive valence of lying. Ito et  al. (2011) investigated the 
neural correlates of deception when remembering neutral 
versus emotional events. The experimental procedure 
was created in two steps: prior to fMRI, subjects were pre-
sented with a series of neutral and emotional pictures and 
were asked to rate each picture for arousal; then, during 
fMRI, subjects were presented with the studied and non-
studied pictures and were asked to make an honest recog-
nition judgment in response to half of the pictures and a 
dishonest response in response to the remaining half. The 
results indicated that deception related to the memory of 
neutral pictures was associated with increased activity 
in the bilateral DLPFC, left VLPFC, and left orbitofron-
tal cortex. They also demonstrated that deception when 
remembering emotional pictures was associated with 
increased activity in the bilateral DLPFC.
Studies have also analyzed specific phases of the 
deception process. For example, to identify the neural 
basis of the preparatory processes that create deception, 
Ito et  al. (2012) instructed participants to memorize and 
judge a series of photographs and determine whether they 
were living or non-living prior to scan initiation. During 
the fMRI, they were instructed to provide an honest recog-
nition memory response or a deceptive response, whereas 
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in the other condition, no information about honest and 
dishonest behavior was provided. These findings provide 
evidence that the DLPFC was activated not only during 
deception but also during the preparation of both decep-
tion and truth telling.
Other studies have focused on the important role of 
deception as an inhibition process. These studies used a 
match-mismatch detection task in which it was expected 
that in each trial, a string of identical digits would be pre-
sented (e.g. 666666); in the match condition, the number 
of digits was equal to the number represented in the 
opposite mismatch. In every trial, the participants were 
instructed to lie or tell the truth. The results suggest an 
activation of the same fronto-parietal network of working 
memory, specifically the right rostrolateral PFC and ACC.
Finally, to investigate other deceptive behaviors, 
Farrow et al. (2015) focused on self-deception and impres-
sion-management. Participants were required to complete 
the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Ques-
tionnaire under two conditions: ‘fake good’ to provide 
the best possible self-impression and ‘fake bad’ to be 
undesirable. The results suggested that self-deception, 
impression management, and faking bad activated the 
medial prefrontal cortex, and VLPFC. In addition, impres-
sion management was associated with an activation of the 
left PFC and left posterior middle temporal gyrus. Faking 
bad is connected with activity in the right VLPFC, left 
temporal- parietal junction (TPJ), and right cerebellum.
Collectively, these studies confirm the primary role of 
the PFC in all stages of lie production. Moreover, it appears 
to be active prior to producing a lie as a general prepara-
tory process, regardless of whether an individual is telling 
a lie or the truth. Other potential markers of deception 
include the left precuneus, left TPJ, and right cerebellum.
Deception studies in clinical 
populations
To provide empirical data on individuals diagnosed as 
‘pathological liars’, a controversial condition in which 
liar behavior is compulsively produced without an appar-
ent benefit to the subject (Mameli, et  al., 2016), Yang 
et  al. (2005) assessed the volume of the prefrontal grey 
and white matter with structural brain imaging in par-
ticipants who lie, cheat, or deceive. In this study, they 
assessed subjects with a history of pathological lying, 
subjects with antisocial personality disorder (without 
pathological lying), and a group of normal controls. Com-
pared with both the antisocial and control groups, the 
pathological liars exhibited an increased volume of white 
matter in the PFC and a decrease in the grey/white ratio 
in the liar group (Yang et al., 2005). The liar group exhib-
ited a 22.2% increase in the prefrontal white matter and a 
41.7% decrease in the grey/white ratio compared with the 
normal controls; compared with the antisocial controls, 
they exhibited a 25.7% white matter increase and a 35.7% 
decrease in the prefrontal grey/white ratio.
In a subsequent study using the same approach, Yang 
et al. (2007) further demonstrated that the increased pre-
frontal white matter in pathological liars occurred in the 
inferior frontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and middle 
frontal cortex. It is unclear whether the findings reflect 
cause or effect; however, these studies implicate the pre-
frontal areas as a neurobiological correlate necessary for 
deception.
Behavioral studies have consistently demonstrated 
that individuals with autism have difficulty making use of 
deception; intriguingly, brain neurodevelopmental studies 
of autism indicate a converse pattern of grey/white ratios 
compared with the liar group. When 2- to 3-year old chil-
dren with autism reach 9.5–11  years of age, their white 
matter increases only 13% compared with 45% in normal 
children (Sodian and Frith, 1992; Carper and Courchesne, 
2000). These anatomical differences were confirmed in an 
experimental study in which children with autism were 
less able to cover up their initial lie compared with typically 
developing children (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Li et al., 2011).
Only two studies have investigated the ability to tell a 
lie in patients with movement disorders who have impair-
ments in cognitive functions, such as executive dysfunc-
tion (Abe et al., 2009; Mameli et al., 2013). It is interesting 
that patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) have been 
described as ‘honest’ because they have a tendency to not 
deceive (Menza, 2000; Ishihara and Brayne, 2006).
In the first study by Abe et al. (2009), deception was 
investigated in PD patients who exhibited an increased 
difficulty in making deceptive responses in an experi-
mental lie compared with healthy controls. Furthermore, 
resting-state 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose PET indicated that 
lie difficulty was significantly correlated with decreased 
metabolic rates in the left dorsolateral and right anterior 
prefrontal cortices, which confirms the critical contribu-
tion of these prefrontal regions to deception.
Mameli et  al. (2013) confirmed these results in PD 
and Essential Tremor patients. Truthful and deceptive 
responses were assessed using a computer-controlled 
procedure, a simplified version of the GKT. Their find-
ings indicated that patients with Essential Tremor and PD 
are less accurate in producing deception compared with 
healthy subjects (Mameli et al., 2013).
Brought to you by | King's College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/5/17 2:42 PM
F. Mameli et al.: Neuroscience in the courtroom      7
These studies conducted on individuals with neuro-
logical diseases represent an additional confirmation of 
the crucial role of the frontal cortex in deception. To date, 
there is a lack of studies regarding patients with frontal 
cortex lesions.
The current findings suggest that although brain 
imaging comprises a more direct index of cognition 
compared with a traditional polygraph, it is subject to 
many of the same caveats; thus, neuroimaging does not 
appear to indicate processes that are necessarily unique 
to deception.
Despite the different experimental protocols imple-
mented in previous studies, the area that was invari-
ably associated with deception is the frontal executive 
system. The always activated areas include the DLPFC, 
VLPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), ante-
rior PFC, and ACC. Additional posterior areas, such as 
the temporal-parietal cortex and cerebellum, were active 
in several studies (Langleben et  al., 2002; Phan et  al., 
2005; Mohamed et al., 2006; Farrow et al., 2015; Kireev 
et  al., 2015). These activations were confirmed in an 
analysis of connectivity that demonstrated an involve-
ment of the fronto-parietal networks, cerebellum, and 
cingulo-opercular networks (Jiang et  al., 2015). Col-
lectively, these neuroimaging studies have indicated 
differences in brain activation between deceptive and 
honest responses; however, despite these similarities, 
the specific methodology utilized to generate a decep-
tive response varied across experiments and involved 
differences in the context, motivation, spontaneity of 
behavior, and response modalities. Therefore, consider-
ing that neuroimaging techniques are operator depend-
ent and may be vulnerable to countermeasures, caution 
is required before applying these methods to real-world 
situations.
Non-invasive brain stimulation 
interferes with the cognitive 
mechanism that underlies 
deception
Non-invasive neurostimulation techniques, including 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (tDCS), have been used to 
assess the validity of brain imaging findings and attempt 
to establish a direct correlation between activity in a corti-
cal region and deceptive behavior by transiently inhibit-
ing cortical excitability (Luber et al., 2009).
In this section, we discuss findings regarding the use 
of non-invasive neurostimulation in deception research.
Studies with TMS
TMS with targeted magnetic fields that temporarily disrupt 
neural processing in a focal area may alter brain activity in 
a specific cortical region (Luber et al., 2009). Through the 
measurement of small but functionally important changes 
in behavior, this technique enables researchers to investi-
gate functioning in a specific brain area in relation to an 
existing behavior. Repetitive TMS (rTMS) alters cortical 
excitability by increasing or decreasing it, depending on 
the stimulation variables. Stimulation at approximately 
1 Hz typically induces inhibition, whereas stimulation at 
higher intensities elicits excitation (Hallett, 2000).
In the first study that investigated TMS effects in 
deception (Lo et  al., 2003), stimulation was applied to 
the left and right motor cortices (at 110% of the resting 
motor threshold), and motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) 
were recorded before and immediately after questions 
that elicited a false response (Lo et al., 2003). The subjects 
were instructed to provide ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answers to ques-
tions that involved simple lies or truths or complex lies or 
truths. The results suggested that the generation of a false 
response was associated with increased excitability in the 
corticospinal tract, which may reflect increased motor 
readiness or a general arousal effect. This finding demon-
strated that TMS may be used to detect differences in corti-
cal excitability between deceptive and truthful responses; 
however, the study did not examine the neural substrate 
for deceptive processing by investigating whether TMS 
could alter deceptive responding.
Testing the hypothesis that withholding the truth crit-
ically depends on the inferior frontal region, Verschuere 
et  al. (2012) experimentally manipulated the neural 
activity level in the right inferior frontal sulcus (IFS) in 
response to neuronavigated continuous theta-burst stim-
ulation (cTBS). Participants underwent three separate ses-
sions. In the first session, the investigators obtained MRI 
anatomical brain measurements from all participants. In 
the second session, they provided participants with infor-
mation regarding the experiment and stimulation proce-
dure, administered an autobiographical questionnaire, 
and initially tested deception. They subsequently applied 
a cTBS protocol or sham TBS using a placebo rTMS coil. 
Immediately after rTMS/sham stimulation, they tested 
deception again. The cTBS-induced right IFS disruption 
left response rates and error rates unchanged from the 
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sham stimulation. These findings do not support a critical 
role of the IFS in deception.
To determine whether competing responses in the 
primary motor cortex may be used to detect deception, 
Hadar et al. (2012) administered a Lie task in which par-
ticipants were instructed to respond truthfully or deceit-
fully regarding facial familiarity (with their little finger 
or thumb). When preparing to lie, the MEPs of the non-
responding digit (i.e. the plan corresponding to the truth) 
exceeds the MEP of the responding digit (i.e. the lie), 
whereas a mirror-reversed pattern occurs when telling 
the truth. This giveaway response conflict interacts with 
the time of stimulation during a speeded reaction period. 
The authors suggest that lies may activate digit-specific 
cortical representations when only verbal responses are 
made. This finding suggests a potential novel index for 
discriminating between honest and intentionally false 
facial recognition.
Finally, to determine whether asymmetric functions 
in the PFC influence the propensity to lie, Karton and 
colleagues conducted three experiments (Karton and 
Bachmann, 2011; Karton et al., 2014a,b). In the first study 
(Karton and Bachmann, 2011), they applied rTMS to the 
left and right DLPFC in conjunction with a Spontaneous 
Lie task. Immediately after stimulation, they conducted 
a Lie task in which the participants could freely choose 
whether to lie or tell the truth. They applied stimulation to 
the left and right DLPFC and left and right parietal cortex 
as a control area. The Lie task consisted of naming the 
color of discs that appeared in a quasi-random order on 
a computer screen. The subjects were instructed to name 
the color correctly or lie about it, naming the other color 
that was not presented in this trial, while being free to 
choose whether to lie. When the subjects could name the 
color of the presented objects correctly or incorrectly at 
their free will, the stimulation succeeded in manipulat-
ing the tendency to stick to truthful answers. Their results 
demonstrated that right-hemisphere DLPFC disruption 
decreased lying compared with the control condition, 
whereas left-hemisphere DLPFC disruption increased the 
propensity to lie. In the second experiment, they investi-
gated whether the application of an opposite rTMS effect 
(facilitating the DLPFC) could reverse the propensity to 
be more truthful to the propensity to produce relatively 
more deceptive responses during right-DLPFC stimulation 
and vice versa (Karton et al., 2014a). When 10-Hz pulses 
were delivered in trains to the right DLPFC, the propensity 
to lie increased, whereas similar left-hemisphere DLPFC 
stimulation left untruthful response rates unchanged. 
The authors concluded that how the right DLPFC and 
other areas functionally associated with it are involved 
in the production of truthful or deliberately deceptive 
statements about perceived objects critically depends on 
the stimulation variables used to manipulate the system. 
Finally, in the last experiment, Karton et al. (2014b) exam-
ined the role of rTMS applied to the DLPFC in conditions 
in which they motivated subjects better to lie than they 
did in their earlier studies and in all possible conditions 
(left and right DLPFC inhibition with 1-Hz and sham rTMS; 
left and right DLPFC excitation with 10-Hz and sham 
rTMS). Before each block, in the experiment testing inhib-
itory stimulation, the subjects received 1-Hz rTMS train or 
sham stimulation to the left or the right DLPFC followed 
by the experimental task requiring them to name circles. 
In the experiment testing excitatory stimulation (lasting 
2 days), subjects received 24 one-second trains at 10-Hz or 
sham stimulation to the left or right DLPFC, followed by 
a 10-s long ‘window’ without rTMS. During this ‘window’ 
subjects did an experimental task requiring them to name 
five circles per ‘window’. The results showed that rTMS 
exciting the left DLPFC decreased lying more than rTMS 
exciting the right DLPFC, but inhibition had no different 
effects. These findings suggest that non-invasive excita-
tory stimulation targeted at the DLPFC can modulate the 
propensity to lie and the direction the excitatory effect on 
lying tasks depends on the cortical target locus.
Collectively, these findings support that the use of 
the TMS on primary motor cortex can help to detect dif-
ferences in cortical excitability between deceptive and 
truthful responses (Lo et  al., 2003; Hadar et  al., 2012), 
while the application of rTMS to the DLPFC produces dif-
ferent effects in propensity to lie depending on the hemi-
sphere stimulated and the stimulation variables (Karton 
and Bachmann, 2011; Karton et  al., 2014a,b). Although 
the right hemisphere stimulation seems to have more 
influence on the production of deception, it is not clear 
to what extent contribute the two hemispheres. The cTBS 
on the right IFS does not seem to interfere with deception 
( Verschuere et al., 2012).
Studies with tDCS
tDCS is a non-invasive technique that is able to manipu-
late brain neuroplasticity and modulate cortical function 
by delivering weak direct currents. It induces long-term 
potentiation-like synaptic changes that facilitate cortical 
excitability, neuroplasticity, and learning. Anodal tDCS 
increases whereas cathodal tDCS decreases excitability in 
stimulated areas (Priori, 2003). As previous research pre-
dicted, tDCS may effectively balance cognitive functions, 
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such as memory, attention, learning, and language, with 
motor functions in healthy and clinical populations (Utz 
et al., 2010; Floel, 2014).
The first systematic study that investigated tDCS-
modulated lying indicated that tDCS (1.5 mA for 10 min) 
applied on the bilateral DLPFC (F3/F4 according to the 
10–20 EEG system) interferes with deceptive responses 
(Priori et al., 2008). Truthful and deceptive abilities were 
assessed with a GKT using a computer-controlled exer-
cise. Accuracy and reaction times (RTs) were determined 
when a participant produces a false response (‘denial lies’ 
but not for ‘false fact generation’) or truthful response. All 
participants were instructed to perform tasks before and 
immediately after anodal and cathodal tDCS and sham 
sessions (offline procedure). They determined that anodal 
tDCS over the bilateral DLPFC significantly increased RTs 
when the participants denied for ‘denial lies’ but not for 
‘false fact generation’ or ‘truth’ responses. These findings 
indicated that non-invasive brain stimulation may modu-
late deceptive processing, thereby slowing the responses 
of participants when they attempted to lie.
To assess tDCS effects directly during deception test 
administration, Karim et  al. (2010) modulated excitabil-
ity in the anterior PFC. Participants received cathodal, 
anodal, or sham tDCS (1 mA for 13 min) during a role-play 
interrogation (online procedure) using a modified version 
of the GKT. The results demonstrated that cathodal tDCS 
facilitated deceptive behavior, as measured by faster RTs, 
a decreased sympathetic skin conductance response, 
decreased feelings of guilt, and an increased behavioral 
pattern during skilful lying. The authors suggested that 
cathodal tDCS, a polarity demonstrated to suppress corti-
cal excitability, relieved the moral conflict brought about 
by the act of deception, as represented in the anterior PFC, 
which thus facilitated deception.
To evaluate the tDCS effect in different types of decep-
tion, Mameli et  al. (2010) investigated whether bilateral 
DLPFC stimulation specifically influences cognitive pro-
cessing for general knowledge deception or influences the 
construct of personal information deception. They admin-
istered a modified GKT during a tDCS session (online pro-
cedure) and determined that following anodal tDCS (2 mA 
for 15  min), the RTs significantly decreased; however, 
this decrease only occurred for lies that involved general 
knowledge (Figure  2). These findings indicate that tDCS 
specifically modulates deceptive responses for general 
information deception, whereas responses related to per-
sonal information remain unchanged (Mameli et al., 2010).
To investigate the tDCS effect on untruthful responses 
in various contexts and response modalities (verbal and 
motor responses), Fecteau et  al. (2013) applied tDCS 
over the DLPFC with three different electrode positions: 
right anodal/left cathodal, right cathodal/left anodal, 
and sham stimulation (2  mA for 20  min). Participants 
completed tasks before and immediately after the tDCS 
session (offline procedure). The results demonstrated that 
active tDCS over the DLPFC reduces the response latency 
for untruthful compared with truthful conditions across 
various contexts and response modalities. Furthermore, 
the hemispheric laterality differed according to the decep-
tion context. Right anodal/left cathodal DLPFC stimula-
tion produced an improvement for untruthful answers of 
relatively guilt-free personal questions on daily activities 
through motor responses and the generation of memo-
rized untruthful answers regarding the subjects’ past 
through verbal responses. The opposite electrode arrange-
ment (left anodal/right cathodal) also improves deceptive 
skills; however, this improvement only occurred for the 
generation of spontaneous and memorized untruthful 
answers about subjects’ past experiences.
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Figure 2: Reaction times (RT) for truthful (left) and lying (right) responses in the Guilty Knowledge Task (GKT).
The histograms are mean RTs for the tasks after tDCS expressed as percent of baseline (y axis) for anodal and sham tDCS (x axis). Error bars 
are SEM. *p < 0.05. [Adapted from Mameli et al. (2010) with permission from Elsevier Society].
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Finally, to investigate tDCS effects on the TPJ, a crucial 
area for the ability to selectively represent the self or another 
individual, Sowden et  al. (2015) determined whether 
inconsistency between an individual’s own opinion and 
the stated opinion of another individual impairs the judg-
ment of the veracity of the statement. tDCS was applied 
over the TPJ or a mid-occipital (MO) control region (1 mA 
for 10 min) prior to completion of a Video-Mediated Lie-
Detection task. After watching each video, the partici-
pants were instructed to rate whether the opinion was 
truth or untruth. The results demonstrated that the partic-
ipants who underwent TPJ stimulation were significantly 
more accurate when the individuals’ expressed opinion 
was inconsistent with their own opinion compared with 
the individuals administered the MO control stimulation. 
In contrast, there was no significant difference in the lie-
detection performance between the stimulation groups 
during trials in which the individuals (in the video) and 
the participants’ opinions were consistent.
Collectively, these preliminary results regarding 
tDCS effects on deception clearly confirm, as in previous 
studies, the contribution of the PFC (Karim et  al., 2010; 
Fecteau et al., 2013). Only one study investigated the effect 
of tDCS in a non-frontal area (Sowden et al., 2015). Inter-
estingly, the improvement in the lie detection accuracy 
following TPJ stimulation may represent a confirmation 
of the frontal parietal network described in a connectivity 
study by Jiang et al. (2015).
The experimental conditions across these studies 
differ in several ways, including the parameter of stimu-
lation (tDCS or TMS), stimulation location, and type of 
deception; moreover, additional studies are necessary to 
explain the results. Nevertheless, these findings clearly 
indicate that non-invasive neurostimulation interferes 
with the cognitive functions that underlie deception.
An overall view
Findings from neuroimaging and neurostimulation 
studies indicate that the liar brain is unquestionably 
located in the frontal executive system.
Neuroimaging studies have consistently demonstrated 
the crucial roles of the DLPFC, VLPFC, VMPFC, and ACC in 
deception; however, they also demonstrated the involve-
ment of multiple brain areas, including the cerebellum 
and the temporal and parietal cortices (Langleben et al., 
2005; Phan et  al., 2005; Mohamed et  al., 2006; Farrow 
et al., 2015; Kireev et al., 2015). It is not clear whether these 
regions are necessary to lie; however, the activation of the 
anterior-posterior network is confirmed by the analysis of 
connectivity that indicated a pattern of activation in the 
fronto-parietal networks, cerebellum, and cingulo-oper-
cular networks (Jiang, et al., 2015). Further confirmations 
from structural neuroimaging studies have demonstrated 
that pathological liars have an increased volume of white 
matter in the PFC (Yang et al., 2005, 2007).
Neurodevelopmental studies have consistently dem-
onstrated that individuals with autism, who have difficulty 
making use of deception, exhibited a converse pattern of 
grey/white ratios in the frontal lobe compared with patho-
logical liars (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Li et al., 2011). Moreover, 
studies in clinical populations confirm that patients who 
have impairments in the frontal circuit, such as PD and 
Essential Tremor, exhibited difficulties in making decep-
tive responses in cognitive Lie tasks compared with 
normal controls (Abe et al., 2009; Mameli et al., 2013).
Brain stimulation studies provide the possibility to 
investigate causal effects in brain areas that mediate deceit 
or truth telling. TMS findings have indicated that the right 
hemisphere may have a crucial role compared with the left 
hemisphere (Karton and Bachmann, 2011; Karton et  al., 
2014a,b), although, surprisingly the IFS does not appear 
to have a critical role in deception as demonstrated by 
neuro imaging studies (Verschuere et  al., 2012). Further-
more, tDCS studies clearly confirm the contribution of the 
PFC (Priori et al., 2008; Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 
2010; Fecteau et al., 2013), as well as the involvement of 
the posterior areas (Sowden et al., 2015). As shown in tDCS 
studies, stimulation of the frontal lobe and the TPJ inter-
fered with deceptive processes, thereby slowing or accel-
erating the responses of participants when they attempted 
to lie (Priori et al., 2008; Karim et al., 2010; Mameli et al., 
2010; Fecteau et al., 2013; Sowden et al., 2015).
With respect to the potential use of these results in the 
legal field, it is interesting to note that when deception is 
relative to personal information (autobiographical), the 
medial structures of the frontal lobe are strongly active 
(Nunez et al., 2005) compared with lies regarding general 
information (semantic memory). These data were also 
confirmed by a tDCS study (Mameli et  al., 2010), which 
indicated that DLPFC tDCS was not able to interfere with 
lies related to personal information, only lies regarding 
general information (semantic memory).
Despite the many insights obtained from neurosci-
ence to date, caution is required when incorporating this 
science into law. We believe that the current lie-detection 
technologies are not sufficient to accurately detect decep-
tion on an individual level, and several issues must be 
considered prior to admitting these neuroscientific tools 
into the courtroom. The principal areas that require 
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further attention include the limited data at the individual 
level and the sensitivity of novel technologies to counter-
measures; moreover, a limited number of studies have 
calculated the accuracy in lie detection, and the results 
are not encouraging (Langleben et al., 2005; Ganis et al., 
2011). fMRI studies have demonstrated that these values 
are in the range of approximately 80%–100%, whereas 
the accuracy decreases to 33% when monitoring the coun-
termeasures (Ganis et al., 2011).
Neurostimulation approaches provide the possibility 
of detecting deception by altering an individual’s ability 
to interfere with cognitive functions involved in deceit; 
however, the research in this field is at an early stage 
and must be validated. Additional major research efforts 
should aim to identify the optimal stimulation parameters 
(site, electrode montage and size, duration, intensity, and 
online vs. offline).
In future studies, approaches that emphasize converg-
ing evidence from multiple methods (neuroimaging and 
neurostimulation techniques) must be developed with the 
objective to identify a valid neuroscientific method for the 
detection of deception.
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